This book review will eventually appear in print. I am posting it ahead of February's series, which will expand on a number of topics covered in the book and this review. The first installment comes tomorrow. Be sure to subscribe to get the latest posts in your inbox!
Stephen C. Meyer holds a PhD in the history and philosophy of science from the University of Cambridge. He is best known for his work promoting the theory of "intelligent design" – that complex biological organisms could not have arisen through natural processes, and thus that the existence of complex biological life requires us to hypothesize a supernatural (in particular, an immaterial) designer. Return of the God Hypothesis is his third major book on the topic, alongside Signature in the Cell (2009) and Darwin's Doubt (2013). Because Meyer is a professing Christian with serious academic credentials challenging the evolutionary status quo, many Christian readers will find it easy to appreciate this latest installment. Nevertheless, I urge caution in appropriating many of his arguments.
The book has five parts, with twenty-one chapters in total. In the first part (chapters 1–3), Meyer traces modern science from its origin in late medieval theology through the eventual elimination of its theistic underpinnings in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the second part, Meyer traces the resurgence of what he considers to be compelling evidence for God over the past two hundred years of scientific discovery. This evidence includes: (i) the discovery that the universe had a beginning (chapters 4–6), (ii) that the physical laws and early conditions of the universe have been "fine-tuned" for the development of complex life (chapters 7–8), and (iii) that the complexity of life itself could not have arisen through natural, materialistic processes (chapters 9–10). In the third part (chapters 11–14), Meyer discusses how scientists choose between competing hypotheses. Based on the evidence in part two, Meyer evaluates the competing "metaphysical hypotheses" of theism, deism, pantheism, and atheism, arguing that theism comes out on top. In part four (chapters 15–19), Meyer addresses more recent discoveries and criticisms of intelligent design. Part five concludes the book with two chapters. In chapter 20 he argues that intelligent design is not a "God-of-the-gaps" proposal, and in chapter 21 he encourages us to take "the big questions" of life seriously.
Meyer is a gifted science communicator. His writing is reasonably accessible (considering the heady subject matter), in the style of science journalism.
I especially commend the first chapter, which deals with the origins of modern science. So often we hear that science has theistic presuppositions, but I suspect that few of us could articulate what it is about Christian theism that makes it so friendly to science – beyond vague appeals to the regularity of the natural world. In chapter 1, however, Meyer argues that the conditions for modern science arose from two trends in late medieval theology. The first was the insistence of some theologians that God had absolute power to create any world that he wanted. (This is often lumped under the blanket category of "nominalism," due to its affinity with other trends in late medieval thought.) If God could create any world he wanted, the natural philosopher could no longer learn about the world by sitting in his armchair and theorizing about how God must have created. Instead, he would need to put down Aristotle (22–23, 27–28), and go out into the world to see what God actually did create. The second trend was the resurgence of Augustinianism, which inspired a healthy doubt about the ability of the human mind to come to the right answers without careful investigation. Together, these produced the empiricism that birthed modern science.
Also laudable is Meyer's insistence that the existence of God is a question that science can inform us about. Many theologians and scientists over the years have suggested that science is completely incapable of answering questions about the existence of God. The aim is often noble: to protect religion from being refuted by science. But such a position is weak biblically and confessionally, and implausible philosophically. To that end, the great strength of the book is showing that science has not refuted (or even disconfirmed) the existence of God. Rather, theists can make perfect sense of the world that science is discovering.
Nevertheless, I doubt the book will convince many people who are not already inclined toward the "God hypothesis." This is because the subject-matter experts will be able to see through much of the rhetoric of the book – rhetoric which often makes Meyer’s arguments seem more compelling than they are. A good example of this comes in chapter 9, where Meyer traces the history of the scientific study of the origin of life. On page 187, as he wraps up the chapter, he writes, "During the last seventy years, every proposed naturalistic model has failed to explain the origin of the functionally specified genetic information required to build a living cell." An examination of the endnote and the bibliography reveals that the most recent source he cites for this claim – besides his own previous book – was published in 1994. So, to demonstrate a claim about "every proposed naturalistic model" in "the last seventy years" he cites works that are more than thirty years old. In some fields this might be acceptable – but not in biology, where the past decades have been incredibly productive. Although he (briefly) addresses some of his more contemporary critics in chapter 15, one can also find the rhetorical pattern elsewhere.
For example, Meyer appeals to a particular notion of "law of physics" to argue that physical laws cannot in principle explain the fine tuning of the universe and the origin of complex life. This (he claims) is because (i) laws cannot include boundary conditions (269–271) or (ii) be probabilistic (284-285), and (iii) scientists cannot propose laws and boundary conditions "arbitrarily" (367). Space does not allow for much discussion of this, but suffice it to say that none of these three stipulations are settled matters in philosophy of science. The same rhetorical pattern comes into play: in support of (i), Meyer cites Michael Polanyi, who died in 1976. Polanyi is neither a recent authority on the matter, nor has his work had a sustained influence in contemporary philosophy of science. By failing to draw attention to ongoing debates on the subject of what the laws of physics are, and by citing old and (now) obscure philosophers on the matter, Meyer crafts a case that sounds more convincing than it has warrant to be. I have only drawn attention to instances of this tactic that I have noticed and am qualified to comment on. I suspect that relevant experts will find more. Caution is therefore appropriate as one reads this work.
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